APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-1181

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
IN RE: MELANIE HANSON JOHNSON and
GERARD STANLEY JOHNSON, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

No. 82-1207

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
JACQUELINE N. RAU,
Appellant,

Petition for Mandamus/Application for
Immediate Temporary Stay

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri

Submitted: March 12, 1982

Filed: June 7, 1982

Before HEANEY, MCMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

This action challenges the validity of a mandatory class certification order rendered by the United States District Court [1] for the Western District of Missouri during the course of litigation arising out of the collapse of two skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri in July, 1981.[2] The class was certified on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages and amount of punitive damages, and includes all business invitees at the hotel during the disaster.

Two objecting plaintiffs (objectors) now petition this court to vacate the order and disqualify the federal district judge asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1), or alternatively, under mandamus.[3] In response the class representative argues that the order is interlocutory thereby precluding appellate review. Alternatively, the class representative argues that the federal district judge did not abuse his discretion in certifying the class and further that the class is appropriate.[4] For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and further that the order must be vacated because it violates the

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[1] The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

[2] *In re Federal Skywalk Cases*, No. 81-0753 CV-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 1982).

[3] The individual plaintiff designations are *In re Jacqueline N. Rau* and *In re Melanie Hanson Johnson*. In addition, defendants Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., Hallmark Cards, Inc., Hyatt Corp. and the Plaintiffs' Liaison Committee participated as amici curiae. All amici curiae oppose class certification, but only the Plaintiffs' Liaison Committee seeks disqualification of the district judge.

[4] The class representative argues that class certification is an appropriate device to handle the claims arising out of the disaster. However, in view of our holding, we do not reach the merits of these arguments.

Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. We also conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) does not require the disqualification of the federal district judge.

On July 17, 1981, two skywalks in the central lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, collapsed killing 114 persons and injuring hundreds of others. Following the disaster numerous individual lawsuits were filed in both the Circuit Court for Jackson County, Missouri (state court), and the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri (district court).[5] The federal district court jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship.

The state court cases were consolidated and assigned to Judge Timothy O'Leary. The federal cases were also consolidated and assigned to Judge Scott O. Wright. Shortly after the first cases were filed, the state and district court consolidated their respective cases for discovery. Each court appointed a Plaintiffs' Liaison Committee to aid in discovery and other matters. In addition, the two courts appointed a joint state-federal Plaintiffs' Liaison Committee to aid in the consolidated discovery.[6] Each court held pretrial conferences and issued pretrial orders concerning the scheduling of discovery.

Prior to the class certification, the Plaintiffs' Liaison Committee accomplished substantial discovery and trial preparation on behalf of all plaintiffs. The accomplishments included nearly completing the interrogatory phase of discovery and serving requests for production upon the defendants. In addition, the committee collected ap-

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[5] By the end of January, 1982, there were approximately 120 cases filed in state court and eighteen filed in district court. In addition, prior to the class certification, 123 claims had been settled at a total settlement cost of $18.5 million.

[6] The state court Liaison Committee consisted of twelve attorneys and the district court committee consisted of five attorneys. Three committee members were appointed by both courts and served on both committees.

proximately 300,000 documents pertaining to the litigation and had arranged for a document depository available to all plaintiffs' counsel. The committee had also arranged for the testing of the skywalk materials by the National Bureau of Standards. Brief In re Melanie Hanson Johnson, Appendix I "Affidavit of Patrick McLarney."

On October 27, 1981, Molly Riley, a district court plaintiff, filed a motion for class certification. The motion sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(I)(B), or in the alternative under 23(b)(3), as to the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages.[1] The basis

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[1] Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

for requesting class certification was Riley's concern that there would be inadequate funds available to pay all claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Riley also moved that her counsel be appointed as lead counsel for the class.

Several federal and state court plaintiffs filed pleadings in opposition to Riley's motion. The objecting plaintiffs challenged Riley's and her attorney's qualifications to represent the class. They also challenged the need for and desirability of class action treatment arguing that there was no evidence of insufficient funds to satisfy all claims. A hearing was held before Judge Wright on December 10, 1981.

Prior to issuing the class certification order now on appeal, Judge Wright became aware that Riley could not serve as class representative because she was not of diverse citizenship from all defendants. Judge Wright then reviewed the complaints on file and determined that plaintiffs Stover, Johnson, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathy were diverse to all defendants.

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appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

Class members in a 23(b)(3) class are free to "opt out" while, under the majority rule, class members in a 23(b)(1)(A) or 23(b)(1)(B) class cannot "opt out." *See Reynolds v. Nat'l Football League*, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).

Thereafter, Judge Wright placed two telephone calls to Robert Collins, Stover's attorney, and inquired whether Stover would serve as class representative if a class was certified.[8] Judge Wright also stated that if Stover would agree to be class representative he would appoint Collins as assistant class counsel to Riley's attorney if a class was certified. Judge Wright and Collins agreed to speak again after Collins consulted with Stover. Collins thereupon called defense counsel and unsuccessfully attempted to settle Stover's claim. Stover then agreed to be class representative.

On January 19, 1982, counsel for the objecting plaintiffs moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), to disqualify Judge Wright based on his communications with Collins.

On January 25, 1982, Judge Wright entered the order appealed from in which he (1) denied Riley's motion for class certification because her citizenship was not diverse from all defendants, (2) certified a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages, (3) certified a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages, (4) selected plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathy as class representatives,[9] (5) selected Riley's counsel as lead counsel, and counsel for the class representatives as assistant class counsel, (6) denied the motion to

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[8] The content of the telephone conversations is disputed. Patrick McLarney, a state plaintiff's attorney, and Max W. Foust, a defendant's attorney, stated that Collins had told them that Judge Wright had told Collins he *was* going to certify a class and appoint Riley's counsel as lead counsel. In re Melanie Hanson Johnson Appendix Volume II Exhibits 13, 14, Affidavits of Max W. Foust and Patrick McLarney. Collins, however, states that Judge Wright only told him that he *might* certify a class. Appendix to Brief In Opposition to Petition for Mandamus Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Robert Collins.

[9] On February 1, 1982, Grigsby, Vrabel and Abernathy were deleted as class representatives because Grigsby had settled and Vrabel and Abernathy were not of diverse citizenship to Hyatt Corp.

disqualify himself under § 455(a), explaining that he called Collins as a matter of courtesy and had intended to call the lawyers for Johnson, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathy but did not do so because the motion to disqualify was filed, and further that he had not decided to certify the class until the order was drafted and entered, and (7) denied objectors' request to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). *In re Federal Skywalk Cases*, No. 81-0753 CV-W-3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 1982).

In support of its order the district court found that the general prerequisites for class actions prescribed by Rule 23(a) were satisfied, *id.* at 5-8, and that the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) were also satisfied. The court stressed that the "interests of all parties concerned" would best be served by "the avoidance of wasteful, repetitive litigation," and that such litigation could be avoided by "trying the issues of liability for compensatory damages, liability for punitive damages and amount of punitive damages only once." *Id.* at 9.

In support of the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class the court found that individual suits on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages would create a risk of inconsistent results. *Id.* at 10.

In support of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class the court relied on three considerations. First, the defendants held liable for punitive damages might lack the funds to pay the full amount of such damages. *Id.* at 11. Second, individual suits for punitive damages would create a risk of unfairness to the other claimants because "there is some uncertainty under Missouri law as to whether a single defendant can be liable for more than one award of punitive damages."[10] *Id.* at 11. Third, the court noted

[10] It appears that the main concern underlying Judge Wright's certification is that there is an uncertain question of Missouri law as to whether plaintiffs may seek to recover multiple awards of punitive damages arising from a single wrongful act of a defendant.

that the prosecution of individual punitive damage actions could create an ethical problem for counsel representing more than one victim in that the counsel would be forced to decide which suit to bring first. *Id.* at 12.

On Februaary 9, 1982, the objectors filed their notice of appeal and petition for mandamus.

Our initial inquiry must be whether the order is appealable. Recognizing that the order is interlocutory, we would nevertheless have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) [11] if that order is injunctive in character. Therefore, resolution of this issue depends upon the nature of the order. The objectors argue that the order enjoins them from prosecuting their state court actions for punitive damages. In response the class argues that the order is not an injunction because it does not use injunction terminology and, more importantly, it does not enjoin the objectors from settling their claims. The class characterizes the order as follows:

> [t]he motion concerns only whether the defendants can use individual punitive damage settlements as evidence to defeat or diminish the recovery of punitive damages in the classwide trial on that issue. *The representative plaintiff and the class have never sought to enjoin any member of the class from entering into an individual settlement of any claim.*

Brief on Behalf of the Representative Plaintiff and the Class at 4 (emphasis added). We do not agree with that characterization and conclude that we do have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).

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[11] 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

> (a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
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> (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . , granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . . . .

The determination of whether an order is an injunction depends upon the substantial effect of the order rather than its terminology. *See Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.*, 317 U.S. 188 (1942); *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975).

In the present case, contrary to the class's assertion, the district court expressly prohibited class members from settling their punitive damage claims:

> Legitimate claimants may negotiate and execute settlements with those defendants who have vociferously urged this court to allow the settlement process to continue. *Those claimants who want to exact payment for allegedly punishable acts must forego the settlement process and await the trial of the punitive damage issues.*

In re Federal Skywalk Cases, slip op. at 17 (emphasis added). In addition, the substantial effect of the order also enjoined the state plaintiffs from pursuing their pending state court actions on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages.

At oral argument counsel for the class argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) should not be construed to apply to class certification because the inevitable effect of a mandatory class is an injunction against state court actions on class issues. We conclude that the argument is not persuasive on the facts before us.

It is true that parties to a mandatory class are not free to *initiate* actions in other courts to litigate class certified issues. *See Reynolds v. National Football League*, 584 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1978). However, in the present case the objectors had commenced their state court actions before the motion for class certification had been filed in district court. The state court cases had been filed, con-

solidated, and discovery had begun.[12] It is this injunction against pending state court actions that gives us jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). *See In re W. F. Hurley, Inc.*, 553 F.2d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 1977); *In re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d at 775.

Because we have jurisdiction over the appeal and because the injunction is interdependent with the remainder of the appealed order, we may review the entire order insofar as it has been appealed. *See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.*, 311 U.S. 282, 287 (1940) (jurisdiction reviewable); *Adashunas v. Negley*, 626 F.2d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1980) (class issues reviewable); *Emerson Electric Co. v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co.*, 606 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1979) (venue reviewable). Therefore, we need not decide whether the order would have been reviewable as a petition for mandamus.

Our conclusion that the order enjoins pending state proceedings necessitates an inquiry as to the propriety of that order under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Act provides that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment."

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[12] Judge O'Leary had also aided in the settlement process by convincing the insurers for Hallmark Cards, Inc., Crown Center Redevelopment Corp. and the Hyatt Corp. to commit a minimum of $151 million of the total $333 million liability insurance coverage to the settlement of the claims. *Hyatt Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co.*, No. CV81-22009 (Mo. Cir. Co. Dec. 30, 1981), transcript 54-55, 75-77.

Prior to the class certification 123 cases had been settled. The settlement process slowed down considerably after the class certification because the plaintiffs were not able to release their punitive damage claims. *In re Federal Skywalk Cases*, slip op. at 17. The defendants were unwilling to pursue only compensatory damage settlements.

In *Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized that the Act imposes a flat and positive prohibition:

> On its face the present Act is an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions. The respondents here have intimated that the Act only establishes a "principle of comity," not a binding rule on the power of the federal courts. The argument implies that in certain circumstances a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings even if that action cannot be justified by any of the three exceptions. We cannot accept any such contention. In 1955 when this Court interpreted this statute, it stated: "This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate *ad hoc* application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions." *Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511, 515-516, [75 S.Ct. 452, 455, 99 L.Ed 600] (1955).

Recently a plurality of the Court in *Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.*, 433 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1977), emphasized the continuing force of *Atlantic Coast Line*:

> The origins and development of the present Act, and of the statutes which preceded it, have been amply described in our prior opinions and need not be restated here. The most recent of these opinions are *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, [92 S.Ct. 2115, 32 L.Ed.2d 705] (1972), and *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, [90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234] (1970). Suffice it to say that the Act is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the Act. The Act's purpose is to forestall the inevitable friction between the state and

federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court. *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 9, [60 S.Ct. 215, 218, 84 L.Ed. 447] (1940). Respondents' principal contention is that, as the Court of Appeals held, § 16 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes a private action to redress violations of the antitrust laws, comes within the "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283.

We test this proposition mindful of our admonition that:

> "[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy." *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra*, [398 U.S.] at 297, [90 S.Ct. 1739].

This cautious approach is mandated by the "explicit wording of § 2283" and the "fundamental principle of a dual system of courts." *Ibid.* We have no occasion to construe the section more broadly:

> "[It is] clear beyond cavil that the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation." *Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.*, 348 U.S. 511, 514, [75 S.Ct. 452, 454, 99 L.Ed. 600] (1955).

433 U.S. at 630-31 . . . .

See also County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54 (1980) (reemphasizing absolute nature of the Act).

Therefore, if the injunction is to be upheld, it must be on the basis that the district court's authority derives from one of the three exceptions. On appeal the class relies on the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception. In support it first draws an analogy between the

order and a Rule 22 interpleader under which a federal court can enjoin claimants from prosecuting claims in state court. The class reasons that here, as in the interpleader situation, there is a limited fund and that the class action is necessary to protect all claimants. We disagree.

The analogy is based on the premise that the possibility of defendants being required to pay only one punitive damage award is comparable to the limited fund concept underlying federal interpleader. That premise is erroneous. "Federal interpleader jurisdiction depends on identifiable property or a limited fund or pecuniary obligation, and it is not proper to predicate jurisdiction on the mere potential to recover damages for pecuniary injury." *Murphy v. Travelers Insurance Co.*, 534 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1976), *citing Wallach v. Cannon*, 357 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1966).

In the present case the class has an uncertain claim for punitive damages against defendants who have not conceded liability. The claim does not qualify as a limited fund which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal interpleader. Without the limited fund there is no analogy to an interpleader and no reason to treat the class action as an interpleader for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.

The class proposes a second analogy between the order and several earlier decisions which allowed an injunction when an insurance company brought a federal suit for a declaratory judgment that a particular policy was invalid and the beneficiary subsequently sues in state court to recover under the policy. We conclude that the analogy is not persuasive.

Initially we note that the most recent case cited by class was decided in 1940, long before the enactment of the

current Anti-Injunction Act.[13] We also note that even the commentator cited by the class acknowledges:

> . . . it seems probable that a federal court would not be warranted in enjoining the prosecution of a pending state action [on the policy], where it is brought during the contestable period and there is an opportunity to set up the defense of fraud in the state court . . . .

1A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 910.225 at 2621.

In addition, the cited cases are distinguishable on the basis that they involved situations in which identical parties were litigating mutually exclusive theories concerning their rights in the same policy in different forums. Such is not the case here. Furthermore, as conceded by the class, the cases involved injunctions against subsequent state actions. In contrast, the injunction in the present case was against pending state actions.

Next the class argues that allowing individual actions in state court will nullify the purpose of the class. The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception, and a pending state suit must truly interfere with the federal court's jurisdiction. As the objectors correctly point out, a plurality of the Supreme Court reaffirmed in *Vendo Co.* its earlier

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[13] The class representative cites the following cases in support of her argument: *Keystone Dairy Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 19 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1927); *Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Teal*, 34 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.S.C. 1940); *Jamerson v. Alliance Ins. Co.*, 87 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 300 U.S. 683 (1937) (by implication); *Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 62 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1933) (by implication). We need not decide how those cases would be decided today. *But see* 17 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4222-4223 (1978), explaining that the Anti-Injunction Act was not applied as an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings until the Supreme Court's decision in *Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 314 U.S. 118 (1941).

holdings that a simultaneous *in personam* state action does not interfere with the jurisdiction of a federal court in a suit involving the same subject matter.

> In *Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 314 U.S. [118], at 134-135, [62 S.Ct. 139, 144, 86 L.Ed. 100 (1945)], we acknowledged the existence of a historical exception to the Anti-Injunction Act in cases where the federal court has obtained jurisdiction over *res*, prior to the state-court action. Although the "necessary in aid of" exception to § 2283 may be fairly read as incorporating this historical *in rem* exception, see C. Wright, Federal Courts, § 47, p. 204 (3rd ed. 1976), the federal and state actions here are simply *in personam*. The traditional notion is that *in personam* actions in federal and state court may proceed concurrently, without interference from either court, and there is no evidence that the exception to § 2283 was intended to alter this balance. We have never viewed parallel *in personam* actions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either court; as we stated in *Kline v. Burke Construction Co.*, 260 U.S. 226, [43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226] (1922):
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> > "[A]n action brought to enforce [a personal liability] *does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction* of the court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of the principles of *res adjudicata* . . . ." *Id.*, at 230, [43 S.Ct. 79 at 81] (emphasis added).
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> 433 U.S. at 641-42 . . . .

In the present case the federal and state actions are *in personam* claims for compensatory and punitive dam-

ages. Therefore, based on the foregoing principles, we are compelled to hold that despite Judge Wright's legitimate concern for the efficient management of mass tort litigation, the class certification order must be vacated. Mr. Justice Black's concluding words in *Atlantic Coast Line* are particularly apt here:

> This case is by no means an easy one. The arguments in support of the union's contentions are not insubstantial. But whatever doubts we may have are strongly affected by the general prohibition of § 2283. Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much, and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion.

398 U.S. at 296-97.

The foregoing ruling does not dispose of the entire appeal because the objectors also seek the disqualification of Judge Wright under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that a judge ". . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The objectors argue that Judge Wright's ex parte communications with Collins raise reasonable questions as to whether Judge Wright is biased in favor of the obliging class members. We disagree.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to disqualify himself if a reasonable person would have factual grounds to doubt the impartiality of the court. *Blizard v. Frechette*, 601 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1979). The determination for the district judge to make is whether "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Once that determination has been made, our role on review is limited to deciding whether the district court's

evaluation of the claim of partiality or prejudice amounted to an abuse of discretion. *Blizard v. Frechette*, 601 F.2d at 1221:

Initially we note that we do not condone Judge Wright's communications with Collins. Once it became apparent that the named plaintiff could not serve as class representative, we think the better practice would have been for the district judge to have called counsel for all potential class representatives and held a hearing to determine whether any of them would serve as class representative in the event the district judge decided to certify a class. However, after a careful review of the entire record, we conclude that Judge Wright did not abuse his discretion in refusing to disqualify himself.

A claim of bias must be evaluated in light of the full record, not simply in light of an isolated incident. *See Walker v. Bishop*, 408 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir. 1969). In the present case Judge Wright developed an extensive record before he made his decision to certify the class. By order dated November 17, 1981, Judge Wright directed the parties and invited all interested parties to submit briefs on any issues relevant to the certification of a class. On December 10, 1981, Judge Wright held a hearing on the motion at which time the parties had the opportunity to present their objections to the court. During the course of the hearing, Judge Wright decided that two additional issues needed briefing, namely (1) whether multiple punitive damage verdicts could be obtained by successive plaintiffs based on the same conduct and (2) whether Missouri law allows recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. These issues were briefed and submitted to Judge Wright before he made his decision to certify the class.

The order itself is carefully reasoned and stresses Judge Wright's concern that "[i]f a defendant can only be punished once, then the first claimant to get an award [of punitive damages] is the first and only winner. The

Court is not inclined to permit the sacrifice of one aggrieved party's claim for the sole benefit of another aggrieved party." *In re Federal Skywalk Cases*, slip op. at 11.

We conclude that Judge Wright certified the class based solely on his judgment that such action would best serve the interests of all parties involved. In addition, we note the complexity of the issues before Judge Wright and commend his creative efforts in attempting to achieve a fair, efficient and economical trial for the victims of the Hyatt Regency disaster.[14] However, as explained above, the order cannot stand on the facts before us.

The order of the district court is vacated.

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[14] We note that several commentators, including Professors Moore, Wright and Miller, also maintain that class actions are particularly appropriate for disposing of mass accident litigation. *See* Comment, *Mass Accident Class Actions*, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 1615, 1616 n.7 (1972).

HEANEY, Circuit Judge dissenting.

The majority decision is very narrow, holding that the mandatory class action certified by the court below violates the Anti-Injunction Act. It is clear, as the majority recognizes, that the Act would not be contravened by an opt-out class action. On remand, the district court should consider whether such an opt-out class is appropriate.

I dissent, nonetheless, because I believe that the district court's mandatory class action, if slightly modified, would be proper. We should modify the district court's order by permitting punitive damage claims to be settled and by providing that the defendants will receive credit for any such settlements when and if there is a class-wide award of punitive damages. Such a modified class action would satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and would not violate the Anti-Injunction Act. Moreover, it would provide the fairest way of all plaintiffs to seek recovery in the manner in which they choose—either through settlement or prompt judicial resolution of their claims.

I.

INTRODUCTION.

The crucial issue on this appeal is the effect of the district court's class certification order on the settlement process. As long as a class suit does not prevent the plaintiffs who wish to settle from doing so, no one seriously contends that it will deny them the opportunity to secure fair and expeditious compensation for their losses —either by settling or promptly proceeding to trial. The objectors, however, urge that settlements are blocked by the district court's order because individual plaintiffs cannot settle punitive damage claims,[1] and thus can-

[1] The district court's class certification order expressly prohibits class members from settling their punitive damages claims:

not execute general releases. Without such general releases, the objectors claim that the defendants are not protected against any further assertion of claims by settling plaintiffs.

I share the majority's belief that those plaintiffs who wish to settle all their claims should be permitted to do so. The class action need not be decertified to achieve this result. This goal can be accomplished by modifying the district court's order: (1) to expressly permit the settlement of punitive damage claims, and (2) to provide that the defendants will receive credit for the punitive claims they settle when and if a class-wide punitive damage award is ordered. Both the class action plaintiffs and the defendants have suggested methods for providing credit to the defendants for any claims they settle.[2] It may be that a hearing on the issue would develop additional alternatives. In my view, the district court should be directed to proceed without delay to hold the necessary hearings and adopt a procedure. As soon as this result is accomplished, the settlement process could proceed unimpeded by the class lawsuit.

Legitimate claimants may negotiate and execute settlements with those defendants who have vociferously urged this court to allow the settlement process to continue. *Those claimants who want to exact payment for allegedly punishable acts must forego the settlement process and await the trial of the punitive damage issues.* [Emphasis added.]

[2] Class counsel suggest that a class-wide punitive damage trial, including settling and non-settling plaintiffs, be held to determine the total puntive damages, if any, to be awarded. The sum awarded would then be allocated among the plaintiffs in accordance with an equitable formula approved by the court, with the portion of the award earmarked for settling plaintiffs credited to the defendants.

The defendants suggest that the plaintiffs who have settled not be permitted to participate in the punitive damage trial and that the defendants be permitted to introduce evidence of the settlements they have reached. The jury would then determine the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be divided among the non-settling plaintiffs at trial according to the approved formula.

II

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY CERTIFYING A MANDATORY CLASS ACTION

The district court's order cannot be vacated unless its certification of the class action constitutes an abuse of discretion. *E.g., Rule v. International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers*, 568 F.2d 558, 563 (8th Cir. 1977). I believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion; its certification order is supported by several important considerations.

A. *Justifications for Class Certification.*

The plaintiffs who sustained serious injuries or seek to recover for the death of family members should not be denied the opportunity to be promptly compensated. Likewise, plaintiffs seeking less substantial actual damages and punitive damages should not be effectively deprived of their claims. A class suit provides a device by which these smaller claims can be aggregated and litigation costs prorated among numerous claimants, thereby making worthwhile claims that might otherwise not be pursued.[8] *E.g., Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper*, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980). *See* Comment, *The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation*, 23 Loyola L. Rev. 383, 384-385 (1977). Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318-1322, 1354-1355 (1976). Thus, a class action provides the best method for *all* plaintiffs to vindicate their legitimate claims.

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[8] Here, individual actions would impose an enormous financial burden on individual victims because of the hundreds of thousands of documents involved, the importance of expert testimony regarding engineering and architectural matters, and the numerous defendants each disclaiming responsibility and pointing at others.

A class suit on the liability and punitive damage issues also provides an effective means to confine and manage the substantial litigation arising from this mass disaster. *See, e.g.*, 7A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil, § 1783 at 116-117 (1972); Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions, supra*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1318-1322, 1354-1355; Note, *Mass Accident Class Actions*, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 1615 *passim* (1972). It conserves litigant and judicial resources by permitting the liability and punitive damage issues to be tried once, and only once; thereby avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits on the same issues involving the same facts and the same defendants.[4] Moreover, it promotes judicial economy, by focusing this litigation in the court that will have to resolve the major disputed issues in this case. The defendants have already begun to file in federal district court their lawsuits to determine the respective liability and contribution issues among the various tort feasors.

Moreover, a single class-wide adjudication of punitive damages ensures that every victim will receive his or her just share of any punitive damage award. Absent a class action, the distribution of punitive damages will be determined in a succession of individual lawsuits. In that event, the risk exists that individual juries will reach inconsistent results on the liability and damage issues. Moreover, even if the results are consistent, the risk

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[4] If the issue of liability for compensatory damages was not tried on a class-wide basis, every individual suit would require a determination of relative fault among all defendants held liable. Individual plaintiffs could not avoid this problem by relying on earlier verdicts because Missouri law while rejecting the old doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, *see Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co.*, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979) (en banc), does not generally allow offensive use of collateral estoppel in multiple claimant tort cases. *See Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp.*, 88 F.R.D. 329, 333 (E.D. Mo. 1980). Due process would forbid the defendants from estopping a plaintiff by relying on an earlier verdict in a suit to which the plaintiff was not a party. *See, e.g., Parkland Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).

arises that late-suing plaintiffs will have their punitive damage recoveries reduced or even eliminated by prior awards because there is certainly some limit on the amount of exemplary damages the defendants will be required to pay.[5] A class action suit provides the most effective—and perhaps only—procedure to ensure that any recovery will be distributed equitably among all plaintiffs.[6] *Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 378 F.2d 832, 838-842 (2d Cir. 1967) (dicta); *In Re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation*, 526 F.Supp. 887, 897-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (hereafter cited as *In re Dalkon Litigation*). *See* Putz & Astiz, *Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?*, 16 U. San Fran. L. Rev. 1, 18-40 (1981); Note, *Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill*, 30 Hastings L. J. 1797, 1800-1812 (1979); Note, *Mass Accident Class Actions*, *supra*, 60 Cal. L. Rev. at 1624-1639.

B. *Objections to Class Certification.*

Despite these justifications for a class action, the objectors argue that the district court's order constitutes an abuse of discretion.[7] Most importantly, they contend that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) simply does not authorize a class

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[5] Punitive damages may be limited here either by Missouri law, constitutional due process, or simply the extent of defendant's assets. *See* slip op. at 24-27, *infra*, for discussion.

[6] As the district court said in *In re Dalkon Litigation*, 526 F. Supp. 887, 900 (N.D. Cal. 1981):

> Without a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action, * * * [t]here is no basis for priority to punitive damages among the claimants, or for awarding such damages to one or more and not to others * * *. [*T*]*he class action is the best available device to protect the interests of all parties.* [Emphasis added.]

[7] A class action certified under Rule 23(b)(1) must satisfy both the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and the relevant subsection to (b)(1). *See* slip op. at p. 4 n.7 for the relevant provisions of Rule 23.

action in this case. A class action may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) when a number of individuals claim rights to a share of a fund that is too small to satisfy in full every individual's claim. *See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.*, 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1976); *Coborn v. 4-R Corp.*, 77 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977). *See also* Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, *supra*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1367. The objectors claim that the facts here do not support the district court's finding that there is a limited fund available to pay punitive damages awards. I disagree.[8]

Missouri law may preclude multiple punitive damage awards for a single wrongful act or omission. At oral

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[8] The objectors also claim that the district court's certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages was an abuse of discretion. They contend that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is designed to eliminate the dilemma that would confront a party if judgments imposing conflicting and mutually incompatible standards of conduct are entered against it. They argue it is not intended, as the district court concluded, to apply to a situation in which there is only a possibility that a defendant might have to pay damages to some plaintiffs and not others. I agree with the objector's construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(A). *See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. District Court*, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); *Esler v. Northrup Corp.*, 86 F.R.D. 20, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1979); 7A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil, § 1773 at 9 (1972).

Although the district court's reliance on Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was misplaced, its class certification was nonetheless appropriate. The issue of liability for compensatory damages could have been properly certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) along with the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages. Under Missouri law, a defendant cannot be liable for punitive damages if he or she is not also liable for compensatory damages. *Probst v. Probst*, 595 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App. 1979). Thus, the prospect of a limited fund is dependent on liability for compensatory as well as punitive, damages. In addition, quite apart from any construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(A), the district court's concern for avoiding inconsistent results through individual determinations of the liability issues is a proper consideration in certifying any of the types of class action authorized by Rule 23.

argument, the objectors and the class representatives both conceded that the state law is uncertain and that there is a legitimate and reasonable argument that a defendant can be punished only once for conduct transcending ordinary negligence. The Missouri Court of Appeals recently dismissed as moot a case in which they might have resolved this question. *Monsanto Co. v. Parker*, No. 43829 (Mo. Ct. App. April 6, 1982). Thus, an award of punitive damages to the first litigant may preclude all subsequent awards to later plaintiffs. The harshness and unfairness of this potential result justifies the district court's class certification.

Even if multiple punitive damage awards are permissible, the class certification was appropriate because the defendants held liable may not have the capacity to satisfy the judgments against them.[9] The claims of those victims who have filed individual lawsuits exceed $1 billion in compensatory damages and $500 million in punitive damages. The total insurance of all the defendants is only $333 million. Moreover, the record does not reveal how that insurance coverage is divided among the defendants and how much, if any, of it is available to pay punitive damage awards.[10] Furthermore, we cannot determine on the record before us the net worth of the various defendants. If the three largest defendants—Crown Center, Hallmark and Hyatt—are not found liable for punitive damages, the insurance coverage and assets of the remaining defendants would become significant in-

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[9] Rule 23(b)(1)(B) does not require proof that claims "will," as a certainty, exhaust the defendant's capacity to pay. Certification is appropriate if there is a significant likelihood that individuals "may" effect claims of parties not before the court. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee note; *In re Dalkon Litigation*, *supra*, 526 F.Supp. at 897; *Coburn v. 4-R Corp.*, 77 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977).

[10] Punitive damages frequently cannot be insured against. *See* Mallor & Roberts, *Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach*, 31 Hastings L. J. 639, 641 (1980).

deed because they may well not be sufficient to satisfy the exemplary damage judgments in view of the large amounts sought by the plaintiffs.

Apart from the defendants' capacity to pay punitive damages, there is surely some limit imposed by law on the amount for which they can be held liable for a single wrongful act or course of conduct. Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of individual lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants' culpability or the actual injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of "fundamental fairness" that is essential to constitutional due process. *See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, *supra*, 378 F.2d at 838-841; *In re Dalkon Litigation*, *supra*, 526 F.Supp. at 900: *See also Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?*, *supra*, 16 U. San Fran. L. Rev. at 29-31; Note, *Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill*, *supra*, 30 Hastings L. J. at 1797-1800. Moreover, the basic jurisprudential precepts that litigation must come to an end and that a party cannot be repeatedly sued on the same cause of action are violated by excessive multiple punishment. *See Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?*, *supra*, 16 U. San Fran. L. Rev. at 29-31; Note, *Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill*, *supra*, 30 Hastings L. J. at 1797-1800.

Consequently, I believe that the district court did not err in finding a significant likelihood that the punitive damage awards *may* exhaust the culpable defendants' capacity to pay the judgments.

The objectors next contend that the named class representative, Shirly Stover, does not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" as required by Rule 23(a)(4). They base their claim on the fact that she did not move for class certification. While a class representative's failure to move for certification has been found in some circumstances to be an indication that he

or she will not adequately represent the class, such a failure is not dispositive of the issue. Indeed, a court may select as a class representative a class member who did not file for certification, *see, e.g., United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty*, 445 U.S. 388, 407 (1980), or it may even elect to certify a class and select a class representative even if no party seeks a class action. *See, e.g., Ford v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 638 F.2d 753, 754 (5th Cir. 1981); *In re Dalkon Litigation, supra*, 526 F.Supp. at 894.[11] In addition, there was, of course, no need for Stover to move for class certification in this case since Molly Riley had already done so.

The objectors also argue that the counsel appointed for the class are inadequate because they are tainted with conflicts of interest. I find no support in the record for this contention.[12]

The objectors next claim that class certification was improper because the various claims present individual issues and the individual claimants have a strong interest in controlling their litigation. In particular, they rely on the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which indicate that class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) generally are inappropriate in mass accident cases.

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[11] The fact that a court has authority to certify a class action *sua sponte* also refutes the objectors claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to create a class action because the only party that did move for certification of a class, Molly Riley, was not diverse to all the defendants.

[12] The objectors complain that the district court appointed class counsel without providing a full opportunity for all plaintiffs to participate in the selection. This conduct did not constitute reversible error; although it would have been the better practice to include all plaintiffs in the selection process. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation, Part 1, §§ 1.90-1.93, 4.53. In the district court's defense, however, it must be emphasized that the objecting plaintiffs indicated as strongly as they could that they had no interest in participating in a class action. If an opt-out class is certified on remand, the district court may provide for additional class counsel.

The petitioners reliance on this authority is misplaced. First, under the express terms of Rule 23, individual control is an articulated concern for courts to consider with respect to certifying a class only under subsection (b)(3), not subsection (b)(1) on which the district court here relied. Thus, the district court was not necessarily required to consider the claimants' interest in individual control before certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(1).[18]

Second, to the extent that the interest in individual control is relevant to certifying a Rule 23(b)(1) class, that concern does not preclude a class suit in mass accident cases. If the drafters of the rule had intended to create such a per se rule, they would have simply said so. *See* Comment, *The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation*, *supra*, 23 Loyola L. Rev. at 405. Instead, the drafters said:

> A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee note.

It is apparent that the concerns that prompted the drafters to conclude that class suits are not generally appropriate in mass accident cases are not applicable here. In this case, the facts relevant to liability will

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[18] The petitioners' reliance on *Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.*, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975), and *Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.*, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1979), for their claim that the interest in individual control of claims supports a denial of a Rule 23(b)(1) class action is misplaced. Both the *Causey* and *Hobbs* courts relied on that interest as a ground not to certify a Rule 23(b)(3)—not a 23(b)(1)—class action.

not differ meaningfully from one claimant to another, and there is little or no likelihood of individual defenses being presented. The compensatory damage issues, of course, will involve differing factual questions, but these claims present no bar to class certification because the district court limited the class action to the liability and punitive damage issues as permitted by Rule 23(c)(4). Consequently, the concerns of individualization of issues and the claimants' interest in controlling their own case present no real obstacle to class suits in mass accident cases such as the instant one. *E.g.*, 3B J. Moore, Fed. Prac., ¶ 23.45[3] at 811 & n.35 (2d ed. 948); 7A Wright & Miller, *supra*, § 1783 at 117; Comment, *The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation*, *supra*, 23 Loyola L. Rev. at 390; Note, *Mass Accident Class Actions*, *supra*, 60 Cal. L. Rev. at 1621.

Finally, the objectors contend that the district court's class certification deprives them of their constitutional rights. First, they argue that a class-wide award of damages to be divided among class members is a "fluid recovery" [14] that denies them their constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.

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[14] A "fluid recovery" has three characteristics: (1) the amount of damages incurred by the class as a whole is adjudicated in a single trial, creating a damage fund; (2) class-member claimants who can prove valid claims may, after the class trial, obtain their proper share of the fund; and (3) the unclaimed portion of the fund is then applied to the class's benefit. *See* Comment, *Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery*, 53 Ore. L. Rev. 225, 227 (1974); Malina, *Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases*, 47 N.Y. L. Rev. 477, 482 (1972).

It is the third characteristic that creates the fluid recovery because the unclaimed funds generally will be turned over to the government or distributed through the market—typically in the form of a reduced charge for an item that the defendant previously overpriced. Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1525 (1976). *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010-1011 (2d Cir. 1973); *Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission*, 318 F.2d 187, 203-204 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Here, the entire punitive damage award would be distributed to individual

The Constitution does not create an absolute bar to a class-wide assessment of punitive damages. The objectors' Seventh Amendment right will be satisfied by the opportunity to adjudicate the class-wide damage assessment before a jury.[18] *See Dickinson v. Burnham*, 197 F.2d 973, 908-981 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 344 U.S. 875 (1952) (1938 version of Rule 23). *See also, e.g.*, Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, *supra*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1523-1525; Wright & Miller, *supra*, § 1784 at 122; Jacoby & Cherasky, *The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments to Rule 23*, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 24 (1974); Comment, *Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery*, 53 Ore. L. Rev. 225, 237 (1974); Note, *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin—Fluid Recovery, Minihearings, and Notice in Class Actions*, 54 B.U. L. Rev. 111, 123-124 (1974). In the absence of defenses that could be asserted against individual class members, or other such individualized inquiries, due process does not require multiple hearings as long as there is one full and fair determination of the merits. *See, e.g.*, Note, *Develop-*

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class members; consequently, the objectors are incorrect in claiming that the district court's order provided for fluid recovery. However, class-wide assessments of damages, even without fluid recovery, have also been challenged as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury. *See* Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, *supra*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1525.

[18] The objectors also claim that a class-wide assessment of punitive damages is impermissible under Missouri law because the damages "must be assessed by a jury in the light of the particular circumstances of the particular case." *Hupp v. North Hills Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.*, 610 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Mo. App. 1980). I disagree. This issue is one of first impression in Missouri. The cases relied on by the objectors are individual suits, not class actions, which merely state that the questions of whether to award punitive damages and, if so, in what amount are for the jury. *E.g., id.; Potter v. Milbank Manufacturing Co.*, 489 S.W.2d 197, 206 (Mo. 1972); *Wiener v. S. S. Kresge Co.*, 465 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. App. 1971). Just as the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is satisfied by adjudicating the class-wide damage assessment before a single jury, the state law requirement is also satified.

ments in the Law—Class Actions, *supra*, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1523-1525; Comment, *Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery*, *supra*, 53 Ore. L. Rev. at 237; Note, *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin—Fluid Recovery, Mini-hearings, and Notice in Class Actions*, *supra*, 54 B.U. L. Rev. at 123-124.

In some circumstances courts have not permitted the class-wide calculation of damages. *See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (1973), *vacated and remanded on other grounds*, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); *In re Hotel Telephone Charges*, 500 F.2d 86, 92 (9th Cir. 1974). In other cases, however, the mechanism has been utilized. *See, e.g., Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission*, 318 F.2d 187, 203-204 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); *West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 314 F.Supp. 710, 744 (S.D. N.Y.), *aff'd*, 440 F.2d 1079, 1089-1091 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). The propriety of class-wide damage assessment, with or without a fluid recovery mechanism, should depend on whether it is consistent with the policies of the underlying cause of action. Note, *Developments in the Law—Class Actions*, *supra*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1526-1536.

The justifications for imposing punitive damages include expressing society's disapproval of outrageous conduct, deterring such conduct in the future, and providing incentives for private civil enforcement. Mallor & Roberts, *Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach*, 31 Hastings L. J. 639, 647-650 (1980). Each of these purposes is advanced by the district court's class certification here. Thus, a class-wide calculation of punitive damages would be proper.

The objectors' second constitutional claim is that the district court denied them due process by not permitting them to be heard after its class certification order. Specifically, they object to the order providing:

> No matters may be presented to this Court which concerns [sic] a member of the class unless it is [sic] presented by the counsel designated to handle the class action. The Clerk of the Court has been directed to reject any matters that are not being filed by counsel for the class or counsel for defendants.

In *Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp.*, 442 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit upheld an order of the district court virtually identical to the one here. The Court held that such an order did not deprive the parties prohibited from filing motions "an appropriate opportunity to participate in the litigation." *Id.* at 459. Indeed, the very nature of a class action requires that the class representative, and his or her attorney, represent the class and that members of the class cannot continue to file motions as they might in an individual action. Moreover, here, as in *Farber*, the district court's order did not bar counsel for class members from applying to it for permission to file a motion. *Id.* at 459. Accordingly, the district court's order did not deny the objectors due process.

C. *Summary.*

In sum, the district court's class action satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23, and the state and federal constitutions. Moreover, certification of a class action would promote judicial economy in a complex case where such concerns are especially significant. It would protect the interests of defendants by avoiding endless relitigation and inconsistent determinations of their relative liability. And, it would protect the plaintiffs by ensuring prompt determination of liability (thereby promoting settlements) and by guaranteeing that any punitive damage award would be fairly allocated to all plaintiffs. Therefore, I believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class action.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT BY CERTIFYING A MANDATORY CLASS ACTION.

The majority recognizes that an opt-out class, which the district court remains free to certify, would not violate the Anti-Injunction Act. Because members of such a class would be free to withdraw and pursue their claims independently in state court, such a class action would not inherently restrict state court proceedings, nor would it afford any basis upon which the district court might enjoin state court proceedings. *See In Re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975).

The majority holds, however, that the mandatory class action violates the Anti-Injunction Act because some class members have already initiated state court proceedings and presumably will be enjoined from pursuing such independent actions. *See* slip op., *supra*, at 10, 15. This is a sweeping rule that prohibits certification of an otherwise proper mandatory class whenever a class member has commenced a state court action. In my view, such a rule is not supported by the cases relied upon by the majority and, moreover, is simply the wrong rule in light of the necessary dictates of mandatory class actions.

A mandatory class action, of course, has a restrictive effect on related proceedings in any other court—state or federal. This is because, by definition, members of such a class cannot pursue independent litigation of class claims. *See, e.g., Reynolds v. National Football League*, 584 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1978). The majority states that a mandatory class only prohibits members from *initiating* independent litigation, citing *Reynolds v. National Football League, supra*, for this proposition. Slip op., *supra*, at 10. Neither *Reynolds* nor any other case cited to this Court supports such a narrow construction

of mandatory class actions. Indeed, the implication of the majority's view is that mandatory classes are not truly mandatory—any member who has previously commenced independent litigation is somehow not subject to the ordinary rules of such class actions. In my view, the plain meaning of a mandatory class does not change merely because some members of the class have previously initiated independent actions. If certification of a mandatory class is proper, as here it clearly is, then the ordinary rules of such actions simply preclude independent litigation of class claims in state or federal courts.

This point is important to whether the class action violates the Anti-Injunction Act. Under the Act, an injunction of state court proceedings is proper when it is "necessary in aid of" the federal court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. It seems self-evident that an injunction to protect the ordinary scope of a mandatory class action is "necessary in aid of" the federal jurisdiction over such a class.

I must emphasize that no plaintiff has, as yet, been enjoined from pursuing any state court action.[16] Our review is thus proper, if at all,[17] to the extent that certifi-

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[16] The only express injunction entered below is that part of the district court's order which appears to prevent class members from settling their punitive damage claims. Such a restriction is unwarranted and should be modified as noted, *supra*, at note 2. In any event, it is not a necessary part of certifying the mandatory class action and it is unfair to bootstrap from this part of the order to a finding that the class action as a whole violates the Anti-Injunction Act. *See* slip op., *supra*, at 9-10.

[17] The district court did not certify any issue for interlocutory appeal. Thus, it would be proper to review, under section 1292(a), only the express injunction before us, *see* note 16, *supra*, and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the issue of whether the class action will result in injunctions of state court proceedings. *See generally In Re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975). I recognize, however, that mandatory class actions have an inherent restrictive effect on independent litigation of class

cation of a mandatory class will *necessarily* restrict class members from pursuing pending state court proceedings. The question then is whether such restrictions are "necessary in aid of" the class action jurisdiction.

Here, the necessary restrictive effects of the mandatory class action are twofold. The first restrictive effect is that class members would not be able to pursue a punitive damage claim in an independent action. Such a restriction is absolutely necessary to the district court's jurisdiction over this class issue due to the applicable state law on punitive damages. Although the parties do not agree on the certainty of the state law rule, they do agree that there is a legitimate and reasonable claim that under Missouri law, only the first plaintiff to achieve a judgment would obtain a punitive award—all other plaintiffs would be frozen out. *See* slip op., *supra*, at 22-25. When a mandatory class is necessary to protect all plaintiffs on this claim, it seems obvious that an injunction against independent litigation of the issue is "necessary in aid of" the jurisdiction of the class.

The second restrictive effect of the mandatory class is to, in effect, stay state court proceedings on the issue of liability for compensatory damages. I emphasize that the plaintiffs are free to settle such claims or to pursue in state court a determination of the amount of such damages, once the class action determines relative liability among the defendants.[18] The mandatory class is necessary to protect the numerous defendants from inconsistent results and extremely burdensome relitigations of their relative culpability and to ensure that serial deter-

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issues. If this fact is to serve as the basis for appellate review, however, such review should focus narrowly on the inherent restrictive effects of the class and should not broadly assume injunctions which have not been entered.

[18] Thus, the mandatory class does not preclude state court forums for those plaintiffs who believe, for whatever reason, that they might obtain more favorable compensatory damages in state court.

minations of liability will not deplete the assets of the defendants. *See* slip op., *supra*, at 24-27. Certification of the compensatory liability issue is also strictly necessary to protect the punitive damage claim noted above because, under ordinary joinder rules, an independent action on liability would necessarily reach both compensatory and punitive issues. Thus, if a mandatory class is to be certified at all, it must include the punitive claim and at least the liability aspect of compensatory damages. In my view, where a mandatory class is properly certified for these purposes, enjoining independent litigation of the class issue is plainly "necessary in aid of" the class jurisdiction.

The majority essentially ignores that it is a mandatory class action we are considering under the Anti-Injunction Act. They cite, for example, *In Re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation*, *supra*, which held that an injunction of state court proceedings was not "necessary in aid of" the federal class's jurisdiction. Slip op., *supra*, at 10. *Turner*, however, involved an opt-out class, not a mandatory one. The standard applied in *Turner* required a determination of whether the class action "can be given its intended scope only by stay of a state court proceeding." *In Re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation*, *supra*, 521 F.2d at 781. As the *Turner* Court properly reasoned, because the intended scope of an opt-out class permits independent actions, an injunction against such actions cannot be "necessary" to protect the scope of the class. *Id.* The *Turner* Court expressly reserved the issue of mandatory class actions, *id.*, for good reason. The intended scope of a mandatory class precludes independent litigation of class claims, which is why an injunction against such independent actions is "necessary" to give the class its intended scope.

The majority primarily relies on the general doctrine that individual *in personam* actions, conducted concurrently in state and federal courts, do not cause interfer-

ence with either court's jurisdiction. Slip op., *supra*, at 14-15. Thus, under the Anti-Injunction Act, an individual *in personam* claim in federal court is not a basis for enjoining other plaintiffs from pursuing similar claims in state court because such an injunction is not "necessary in aid of" the federal court's jurisdiction. *Id.* This rule developed around and applies to independent, *individual* claims, not mandatory class actions. The majority cites to no case in which this general rule has been used to preempt the ordinary application of mandatory class action rules.

Admittedly, the relationship between mandatory class actions and the Anti-Injunction Act appears to present an open question. The approach adopted by the majority, however, broadly forecloses mandatory class actions whenever a class member has commenced state court proceedings. I would agree that class actions should not become a vehicle for circumventing the ordinary relations between state and federal courts. The requirements for a mandatory class action, however, are quite rigorous and, by their nature, will prevent any such trend from developing. Moreover, there are unusually strong reasons for certifying the mandatory class here, a procedure which the district court found was essential to fair adjudication of all claims. Such circumstances will not often arise; yet in face of them, the majority has adopted a rule which broadly defeats the purpose of mandatory class action jurisdiction. I do not agree that such a rule is required by the Anti-Injunction Act, nor by any sensible view of the relations between state and federal courts.[19]

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

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[19] I do, however, agree with the majority that Judge Wright did not abuse his discretion by declining to disqualify himself from this case under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term 1981

Nos. 82-1181/1207

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
MELANIE HANSON JOHNSON, *et al*,
Petitioners.

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
JACQUELINE N. RAU,
Appellant.

Petition for Mandamus/Application
For Immediate Temporary Stay

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri

The Court, having considered petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc and being now fully advised in the premises, hereby orders the petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc denied. Chief Judge Lay, Judge Heaney and Judge Bright would grant the rehearing en banc. Judge John R. Gibson did not participate in the considerations of the petitions.

The petition for rehearing considered by the panel is also denied.

July 9, 1982

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term 1981

No. 82-1181

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
IN RE: MELANIE HANSON JOHNSON and GERARD STANLEY JOHNSON, *et al*,
Petitioners.

No. 82-1207

IN RE: FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES
JACQUELINE N. RAU,
Appellant.

Petition for Mandamus/Application
For Immediate Temporary Stay

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri

Motion for stay of issuance of mandate pending application for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States has been considered by the Court and is denied.

Judge Heaney would grant the stay.

July 28, 1982

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

No. 81-0945-A-CV-W-5

IN RE FEDERAL SKYWALK CASES

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

January 25, 1982

This action arises out of the collapse of two skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel of Kansas City, Missouri on July 17, 1981. Plaintiff, Molly Riley, moves this Court to certify as a class action those claims of business invitees of the hotel who suffered physical, mental or property damage as the result of the collapse of the two skywalks. Several plaintiff-intervenors and defendants oppose class certification for varied reasons. Other defendants have not expressly opposed certification, but have asked the Court to delay its ruling on the motion to certify a class action until all of the parties have had an opportunity to voluntarily resolve their differences through settlement. All interested parties orally argued the motion on December 10, 1981.

On December 24, 1981, plaintiffs-intervenors moved to dismiss the motion for class certification on the ground that plaintiff Riley had failed to join all parties needed for a just adjudication. Ms. Riley, a Kansas resident, did not join two Kansas defendants because she lacked diversity of citizenship as to them. Since two defendants could not be bound by any determinations made at a single trial if Ms. Riley were named as the class representative, plaintiffs-intervenors' motion to dismiss her motion to certify is granted. This Court, however, may certify a class action on its own motion. Thus, for the

reasons which follow, the Court concludes that the most principled, efficient and expedient manner in which to conduct the litigation stemming from the tragic events of July 17 is in accordance with the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court determines that federal court plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey shall represent the class members, certifies a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and liability for punitive damages, and certifies a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages. Finally, the Court permits the individual unnamed plaintiffs to continue to settle their respective claims against any or all defendants.

I. *Summary of Skywalk Litigation*

On July 17, 1981, two skywalks in the central lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri collapsed killing 113 persons and causing bodily injury to at least another 212 persons. Three days later the first lawsuits were filed in this Court and in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. As of the date of this order, approximately 150 lawsuits have been filed in either of these two courts. In anticipation of the deluge of litigation that the skywalk disaster was certain to generate, the state and federal courts moved with alacrity to consolidate their respective cases for pretrial discovery. Liaison committees of plaintiffs' and defense counsel were selected to jointly initiate and conduct pretrial discovery.

Plaintiff Riley initially filed a civil action seeking class certification by the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri on July 31, 1981. On September 1, 1981, Ms. Riley filed a similar action in this Court. In her action in this Court, Riley, a resident of Kansas, did not sue certain Kansas defendants. She dismissed her state court suit on September 24, 1981, and then moved this Court to certify a class action naming her as the class representative of all business invitees who were present at the

Hyatt Regency Hotel when two of its skywalks collapsed. On December 10, 1981, a hearing was conducted to determine whether her motion for class certification should be granted. From that hearing the Court finds the following facts to be true:

1. The collapse of two skywalks in the Hyatt Regency Hotel on July 17, 1981 killed 113 persons and caused bodily injury to at least another 212 persons.

2. A substantial number of persons who were present in the central lobby when the skywalks fell might have suffered emotional distress or might have failed to report their physical injuries.

3. Approximately 150 civil lawsuits have been filed in either this Court or the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.

4. Those persons who have filed lawsuits presently seek compensatory damage awards in excess of one billion dollars and punitive damage awards in excess of 500 million dollars.

5. The various defendants implicated by these suits are protected by liability insurance coverage in the aggregate amount of 333 million dollars.

6. By way of *in camera* revelation, the Court is cognizant of the approximate net worth of defendants Hyatt Corporation, Hallmark Cards Corporation, and Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation.

7. Numerous minor and some substantial claims have already been amicably settled.

8. The liability insurance carriers have been and are eager to continue to discuss the settlement of any legitimate claim.

After the December 10, 1981 hearing, plaintiffs-intervenors moved to dismiss Riley's motion for class certification on the ground that she failed to join certain parties who are needed for a just adjudication. The Court found merit in the plaintiffs-intervenors' motion to dismiss and,

as a consequence, commenced a search of court records in order to determine which federal court plaintiffs could serve as representatives of the class. The Court notices that plaintiffs Stover, Johnson, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey have citizenships diverse from the defendants who have been sued. Only plaintiff Johnson, an intervenor in this action, has recorded apposition to the certification of the class action.

II. *Prerequisites to A Class Action*

The class action device, as contemplated by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is the proper tool for the accomplishment of principled, efficient and expeditious adjudication of skywalk claims which threaten to expose defendants to repeated trials of the compensatory and punitive damages issues, which threaten to leave many claimants without a practical chance for redress of punishable acts, and which threaten to congest the state and federal courts of this city for many years. This Court views Rule 23 as the key building block in the federal courts' continuing effort to make the civil procedural system more responsive to the needs of contemporary litigation. The magnitude of the litigation spawned by the collapse of two skywalks challenges this Court to administer these cases with flexibility and imagination. While other procedural vehicles might provide adequate guidelines for resolution of the complex issues posed by these cases, the circumstances of this litigation compel this Court to adopt the far superior procedures of Rule 23 for the resolution of the many claims arising out of an unfortunate tragedy.

A. *Diversity Jurisdiction*

The jurisdictional requirements of a conventional civil suit apply to class actions. *See Snyder v. Harris*, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). In the context of a class action, only the citizenship of the named parties is relevant to the determination of jurisdiction. *Id.* Mr. Justice Black stated in *Snyder* that if

> one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant and have nothing to fear from trying the lawsuit in the courts of their own State.

Id. at 340. Since at least two defendants which have been sued in the course of this litigation are of the same citizenship as plaintiff Riley, Riley cannot serve as the named representative of the class if the Kansas defendants are to be bound by the determinations made at the trial of the class action. As is subsequently discussed, the Court intends to try this lawsuit only once and to bind all parties to the determinations made at that single trial. Thus, Riley will not do as the named representative because her citizenship is not diverse from all the opponents of the class.

The citizenships of plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey, however, are diverse from the citizenships of all the defendants who have been sued. In addition, there appears to be no question that their claims, like the claims of all other members of the class, exceed the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court, therefore, concludes that, with these plaintiffs as the named representatives of the class, diversity jurisdiction exists and that all parties needed for a just adjudication of the issue presented by this unit can be joined.

B. *Rule 23(a)*

Rule 23(a) provides that these plaintiffs may sue as the representative parties of a class of all business invitees present at the collapse of the skywalks if

> (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of

law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Before the circumstances of this case can be analyzed in terms of those four prerequisites, the introductory language of Rule 23(a) implicitly requires two preliminary determinations. First, a class, which is capable of accurate description, must actually exist. *Vietnam Veterans Against The War v. Benecke*, 63 F.R.D. 675, 679 (W.D. Mo. 1974). The members of the proposed class are readily identifiable. They include all business invitees who were present in the main lobby of the hotel at the moment the two skywalks collapsed. Second, plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey must be members of the proposed class. There does not appear to be any serious question that their claims arise out of deaths and injuries suffered by persons present in the hotel lobby at the time of the skywalks' collapse. If any serious questions do arise, interested parties are obliged to file a motion to decertify.

In addition to satisfying the two preliminary requirements of Rule 23(a), each of the following Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been satisfactorily established:

1. Numerosity. Exactly 113 persons have died as a result of the collapse of the two Hyatt skywalks. At least another 212 persons suffered injuries which required hospitalization or treatment at an area hospital on the day of the collapse. In addition, a substantial number of people were present in the central lobby of the hotel when the skywalks fell. Though this latter group of people may not have suffered any physical injuries which required immediate attention, they might have suffered emotional distress as a consequence of the disaster. It has been estimated that a crowd of 1,500 to 2,000 persons were in the lobby of the hotel at the moment of the collapse. A

class which includes all business invitees present when the skywalks fell is sufficiently numerous to satisfy the requirement that joinder of all members of the class is "impracticable." *Coburn v. 4-R Corp.*, 77 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1977). Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a showing that joinder is "impossible." A showing of strong litigational inconvenience in the prosecution of claims separately by the proposed class members is sufficient. Thus, the first prerequisite of Rule 23(a) is satisfied.

2. Commonality. The claims of every member of the class arise from the collapse of the two skywalks. With the single exception of the amount of individual compensatory damages, the operative facts concerning each claim are identical. There are no issues of liability or defenses to liability for compensatory damages peculiar to individual members of the class. The issue of liability for punitive damages may require separate treatment of the wrongful death and survival claims. The Court, however, is prepared to provide the distinct treatment through the formation of a sub-class composed of wrongful death and survival actions in the event that it is subsequently determined that punitive damages are not available to wrongful death or survival claimants. Further, Rule 23(a)(2) requires only that there be one or more significant common questions of law or fact. It does not require that "all" questions of fact and law be common and must be distinguished from the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that common issues predominate. Thus, the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. *Like v. Carter*, 448 F.2d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972).

3. Typicality. The claims of the four named plaintiffs reflect the claims of every other member of the class. Plaintiff Stover and her children seek redress for the allegedly wrongful death of her husband and for the alleged serious injuries she suffered as a result of the collapse. Plaintiffs Vrabel and Abernathey allegedly suf-

fered personal injuries, while the Grigsby plaintiffs have sued to recover for the alleged wrongful death of their mother. Though the amount of compensatory damages is unique to each member of the class, the legal or remedial theories advanced by the class representative are the same as those advanced by other unnamed members of the class. Thus, the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied. *Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co.*, 554 F.2d 825, 839-30 (8th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 856 (1977).

4. Adequacy. This Court bears an affirmative obligation to ascertain the adequacy of representation and to monitor it throughout the course of the litigation. The duty is grounded on a fairness rationale which recognizes that some class members did not choose this forum or the counsel ultimately selected to shoulder the burdens of this litigation. The adequacy inquiry focuses on the representative parties and the class counsel.

The class representatives are able to act as fiduciaries in protecting class interests and have resources available for the prosecution of the certified claims. They do not have any interest which conflicts with interests of other class members, are not motivated by reasons which are unrelated to the circumstances of the case itself, and hold a very substantial stake in the outcome of the controversy. Some parties have asserted that their interest in settling their cases conflicts with the prosecution of a class action. Their interest in settling their claims, however, is not restricted by this order. The only parties who cannot settle their claims prior to the conclusion of a jury trial of the certified issues are those named as the class representatives. If any of the plaintiffs named as class representatives in this order would want to negotiate the settlement of their case prior to trial, they should notify this Court within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

The Court selects the counsel for plaintiff Riley to serve as lead counsel for the prosecution of this class action. Counsel for plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey may assist plaintiff Riley's counsel. These counsel can adequately represent the members of the class. The lead class counsel have experience in complex litigation and are ably qualified to conduct the proposed litigation. In the estimation of this Court, lead counsel have exhibited sufficient motivation, competence and resources to successfully maintain a class action. The Court also notices that counsel for Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey are able attorneys who have extensive experience in the areas of personal injury law and will grant them ten (10) days from the date of this order to withdraw as assistant class counsel if they would prefer not to serve. In addition to these class counsel, the Court has received numerous offers of assistance from interested attorneys and will grant other interested attorneys an additional seven (7) days from the date of this order to submit their names for service as class counsel. In light of all of the above, the Court concludes that the four native plaintiffs are adequate class representatives and that the counsel presently selected by the Court can adequately represent the interests of the class.

III. *Maintainable Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)*

Not only must this action meet all the prerequisites of a class action as listed in subdivision (a) of Rule 23, but it must also satisfy at least one of the three sections of subdivision (b) of Rule 23. Riley initially moved this Court to certify a class action on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and the issue of liability for compensatory damages under either Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule 23(b)(1)(B). While no other plaintiff joined in Ms. Riley's motion to certify a class action, counsel for numerous other plaintiffs either have voiced their support for the utilization of the class action device or have offered their services

in the event that a class action is certified. The Court has also received correspondence from individual claimants who have questioned the true motivation of those counsel who opposed class certification and have asked the Court to guard the best interests of all the parties involved. Though some of the defendants have taken the position in this litigation that they cannot lawfully be subject to multiple punitive damage awards in successive suits, none has moved this Court to certify a class action in order to protect them from multiple punitive damage awards or incompatible standards of conduct. Some defendants, while neither opposing nor supporting certification, have asked the Court to defer its ruling on the motion to certify until all of the parties have had an opportunity to voluntarily resolve their legitimate claims through settlement.

Rule 23(c)(1) directs this Court to determine whether a class action to be maintained as soon as practicable after the commencement of the action. Since the ruling of this Court does not impinge on the ability of unnamed plaintiffs and defendants to settle their differences, there is no just reason for delay of this decision. Although this Court has denied plaintiff Riley's motion to certify a class because complete diversity was lacking, this Court, nonetheless, enjoys a wide range of discretion in determining whether a class action ought to be maintained, *Senter v. General Motors Corp.*, 532 F.2d 511, 520-21 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); *Castro v. Beecher*, 459 F.2d 725, 731-32 (1st Cir. 1972), and what issues ought to be certified, *Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.*, 559 F.2d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 1977). *See generally, American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah*, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). It is this Court's firm belief that the preservation of the collective best interests of all parties concerned with this litigation and the avoidance of wasteful repetitive litigation are best accomplished by trying the issues of liability for compensatory damages, liability for punitive damages and amount of

punitive damages only once. To that end, this Court, on its own motion, determines that a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and liability for punitive damages, and a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages must be certified.

A. *Requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(A).*

Rule 23(b)(1)(A) directs the Court to consider whether multiple individual suits aimed at determining any or all defendants' liability for compensatory and punitive damages would have an adverse effect on those defendants. The subdivision provides that a class action may be maintained if the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." Thus, in order to consider Rule 23(b)(1)(A) as a proper vehicle for resolving the liability issues, there must be a risk that separate actions will, in fact, be tried if a class action is not certified.

Given the nature of the personal injury and punitive damage claims filed in this litigation, this Court would be embarking on utter naivete if it concluded that there was not a substantial likelihood of multiple suits being tried. *See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward*, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561-62 (S.D. Fla. 1974), *aff'd* 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975). Not all claimants will be mollified by the amounts offered in settlement, since they have expressed an avowed determination to try to punish those defendants, if any, which were responsible for the tragic events of July 17. While this Court wholeheartedly encourages the continued settlement of legitimate claims, and is mindful that the vast majority of claims may be settled, it cannot, in good conscience, allow a minority of claimants to take any or all defendants to trial time and time

again until a compensatory or punitive damage judgment is obtained. *Hernandez, supra* at 561.

Though no defendant has expressly moved this Court to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action in order to protect it from successive punitive damage awards or from inconsistent adjudications on the liability issues, the Court believes that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) certification is necessary as a ready and fair means of achieving unitary adjudication. *See*, Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 95, 100 (1966). *See also Hernandez, supra* at 560. One or more of the defendants risk being faced with incompatible standards of conduct if varying or inconsistent adjudications with respect to individual members of the class were obtained on the issues of liability for compensatory or punitive damages. *Coburn v. A-R Corp.*, 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977); *Hernandez, supra* at 561. As in the case at bar, the defendants in the *Hernandez* case objected to the certification of a class action on the ground that certification would prevent the amicable settlement of legitimate claims. *Id.* at 559 n. 3. The *Hernandez* court did not allow the settlement process to continue because of the limited fund available to pay compensatory damages, but certified the class in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and inconsistent or varying adjudications. *Id.* Unlike the circumstances facing the *Hernandez* court, in the case at bar, there is no evidence of a limited fund with respect to the payment of compensatory damages. Thus, the settlement of claims for compensatory damages may continue.

Since a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages offers economy of effort and uniformity of result without imposing undue debilitation of the procedural or substantive safeguards of members of the class or of persons defending against the class action, this Court concludes that a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages must be certified.

B. *Requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B).*

Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides for class treatment in cases in which separate suits might have undesirable effects on the class members. The passage states that a class action might be maintained if individual actions would create a risk of individual adjudications that "would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." While Rule 23(b)(1)(A) focuses on the possible prejudice to the party opposing the class, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) focuses on the ability of the individual members of the class to protect their interests if other class members brought separate actions. It is quite common for suits brought under Rule 23(b)(1) to meet the tests of clause (A) and clause (B) of that provision. *See generally* 7A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1772 n. 72 (1972 & Supp. 1981). So long as a class action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), nothing turns on which clause is controlling. *Id.* at § 1772.

Rule 23(b)(1)(B) most often applies to cases that involve multiple claims to a fund which may be insufficient to satisfy all the claims. *See, e.g., In Re "Dalkon Shield" Litigation*, Slip. op. C80-2213 SW, (N.D. Cal., Nov. 5, 1981); *Coburn v. 4-R Corp.*, 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); *Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward*, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1974), *aff'd*, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975). Where a limited fund exists, individual members of the class face a very real risk that the winner of the race to the courthouse might be awarded all of the monies available. Though the availability of sufficient funds to cover the claims for compensatory damages is not presently in question, there is a question as to whether sufficient funds are available to pay awards of punitive damages.

At the present time, the funds available to pay for punitive damages appear to be limited. For example, the continued payment of compensatory damages necessarily depletes the resources of the defendants who continue to settle claims against them. Second, there is the possibility that few, if any, defendants will be found liable for punitive damages. No defendant has unlimited assets and most do not have sufficient assets to warrant a sizable punitive damage award. Finally, there is some uncertainty under Missouri law as to whether a single defendant can be liable for more than one award of punitive damages. *See Monsanto Co. v. Parker*, No. 43829 (Mo. App., E.D., argued Dec. 9, 1981). If a defendant can only be punished once, then the first claimant to get an award is the first and only winner. The Court is not inclined to permit the sacrifice of one aggrieved party's claim for the sole benefit of another aggrieved party.

Because of the uncertainty under Missouri law as to whether a single defendant can be liable for more than one award of punitive damages, the plaintiffs who have intervened move this Court to abstain from ruling on the motion for class certification until after a Missouri appellate court has resolved the question. It is this uncertainty, however, which requires this Court to refrain from abstaining. So long as the question is unsettled, the spectre of a limited fund remains. Even after that particular question is resolved by the courts of Missouri, the possibility of a limited fund might still exist. The Court, therefore, denies the intervenors' motion to abstain from certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action.

It is the primary concern of this Court that legitimate claimants receive recompense for the actual damages that they have suffered. Because of this overriding concern, the Court will permit the continued settlement of claims even though each settlement diminishes the funds available to pay for punitive damages. Though the Court

considers an award of punitive damages secondary to compensation for actual damages, a claimant's interest in exacting punishment against a deserving defendant is recognized by the law and must be protected. Only a single class-wide adjudication of the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages can protect the interest of every victim in receiving his or her just share of any punitive damage award.

There is one final consideration that indirectly bears on this Court's decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action. Those counsel who presently represent more than one client and who have sought punitive damages on behalf of each of those clients face a potential conflict of interest. In the context of a limited fund, an attorney who represents more than one client may be put in a conflicting position when forced to decide which case to proceed with first. *See* Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) and Rule 5-105(C). The interests of one client may ultimately be sacrificed for the benefit of another client. Even if a limited fund did not exist, if Missouri law precludes multiple awards of punitive damages against a single defendant, the same result obtains. Plaintiff-intervenors assert that the conflict is readily resolved through full disclosure to their clients and eventual settlement of their cases. One of the attorneys for the intervenors, however, admitted at the class certification hearing that he had not disclosed the potential conflict to his clients. The Court further believes that counsel who represent more than one client may still be in a position of conflict if they must advise their clients to settle in order to insulate themselves from a conflict of interest on the punitive damages claims. The Court is mindful that counsel must always avoid even the mere appearance of impropriety.

Thus, since a class-wide resolution of the punitive damages issues protects not only the class members from the spectre of an exhausted fund, but may also resolve

the potential conflicts of interest faced by counsel who represent more than one punitive damage claimant, the Court deems it wholly appropriate to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages.

IV. *Intervenors' Motion to Disqualify*

On January 19, 1982, the plaintiffs-intervenors filed a motion, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 455, in which they asked the Court to disqualify itself from the skywalk litigation on the ground that its impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The motion is presumably generated from a series of conversations which counsel for the intervenors engaged in with counsel for plaintiff Stover.

In the course of evaluating the issues raised by the certification of a class action in the skywalk litigation, the Court commenced a survey of its records to determine which plaintiffs, who have filed suit in this Court, could serve as representatives of a class action. The Court noticed that plaintiffs Stover, Johnson, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey could serve as class representatives. Court records reflected that only plaintiff Johnson, an intervenor and an initiator of the disqualification motion, is fervently opposed to the certification of a class action. With respect to the other four parties, the Court noticed that its records did not indicate what positions these parties held concerning the certification question. Before naming these parties as class representatives on the Court's own motion, the Court deemed it courteous to inquire as to their respective positions. To that end, the Court first contacted counsel for plaintiff Stover.

Counsel for plaintiff Stover were informed that the Court was contemplating naming their client as one of the representatives of a class action if the Court decided to certify a class action. The Court inquired as to their position on the certification issue. Counsel for Stover

were not able to give the Court an immediate answer and advised the Court that they could publish their client's position within ten days as they were scheduling a settlement conference with defense counsel.

Before the Court was able to inquire about the respective positions of the other three parties, counsel for the intervenors moved this Court to disqualify itself from the skywalk litigation, alleging that the Court's survey had given plaintiff Stover an advantage in settling her case and, thus, raised the question of whether the Court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Though this Court, to whom the motion to disqualify was addressed, presumably knows more about the factual background of its involvement in matters that form the basis of the motion than do the movants, *Laird v. Tatum*, 409 U.S. 824, 824 n. 1 (1972) (Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist), the Court considers the motion as if the allegations are true.

The intervenors have alleged that this Court informed counsel for Stover that a class action would be certified, that Stover would serve as the representative of the class members and that an order certifying a class action would not be issued on January 15, 1982. The intervenors further allege that plaintiff Stover gained an advantage not available to the intervenors because she knew that she did not have to settle her case before January 15, 1982 and that she could pressure the defendants into paying her a premium to keep her from becoming a class representative.

Assuming that all of these allegations are entirely true, even though they are not, the Court must scrutinize its impartiality as a judicial officer under Section 455(a) which provides that this Court shall disqualify itself from any proceeding in which its "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). While disqualification is certainly not automatically required merely upon the filing of an affidavit, *Mavis v. Commer-*

cial Carriers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 61 (C.D. Cal. 1975), it is incumbent on this Court to determine whether this is a proceeding in which its impartiality might be questioned. The standard of general disqualification is one of reasonableness and is not interpreted to include a "spurious or loosely based charge of partiality." *Mavis, supra*, at 61. The 1974 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455 codified Canon 3C of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct. In so providing, Congress cautioned:

> While the proposed legislation would remove the "duty to sit" concept of present law, a cautionary note is in order. No judge, of course, has a duty to sit where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, the new test should not be used by judges to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial cases.
>
> At the same time, in assessing the reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each judge must be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected adverse decision. Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a *reasonable* basis. Nothing in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the transformation of a litigant's fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a "reasonable fear" that the judge will not be impartial. Litigants sought not to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality, but they are not entitled to judges of their own choosing.

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, House Judiciary Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6355 (emphasis in original).

In applying the objective standards established by Congress in Section 455(a), the Court finds the legislative history enlightening. The decisions of other courts that have faced disqualification motions provide some guide-

lines, *see* Federal Judicial Conference, *Decisions Construing the Judicial Disqualification Statute* (1977), but those decisions, unlike decisions governing other issues of law, cannot directly bear on the question that this Court must resolve. *Bradley v. Milliken*, 426 F. Supp. 929, 934 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Even though introspection might dictate disqualification or qualification where other judges, who necessarily have incomplete knowledge, could reach alternative conclusions, the cases construing Section 455(a) illustrate the wisdom of having this judge resolve, in the first instance, the question of his own disqualification. *Id. citing United States v. Mitchell*, 377 F. Supp. 1312, 1323 n.8 (D.D.C. 1974) (Sirica, C.J.). The legislative history implies the same.

The intervenors assert that this Court was no longer impartial in this case when it inquired as to the position of plaintiff Stover on the issue of class certification. According to intervenors, plaintiff Stover gained an unfair advantage in the settlement of her claims. The advantage was presumably gained through knowledge that an order certifying a class action would not be issued on January 15, 1982. The Court has never imposed a deadline for the issuance of any of its orders in any case. The intervenors do not point to any evidence which demonstrates that the Court had bound itself to resolve the class certification on any particular date. The Court had anticipated resolving the certification issues and setting the discovery schedule by mid-January, but a series of motions filed by the intervenors concerning the certification issue have been filed throughout the month of January. Each of these required and have received the Court's attention. The Court, mindful of the great importance of these suits to the people of Kansas City, has tried to process the motions filed in this case as fast as practicable and will continue to do so.

Intervenors have not, and cannot, show that this Court had guaranteed that an order would be filed on January 15, 1982, or that the merits of this case were discussed

with anyone. Thus, all parties "labored" under the same "supposed" disadvantages. The intervenors assert that they were facing the pressure of a January 15, 1982 settlement deadline. As previously stated, the pressure was self-generated and based on speculations rampant in the legal community. The intervenors had no knowledge of when an order would be issued and did not know what this Court's position would be with respect to the continued settlement of their cases. As this order makes clear, the fear that settlements would be halted by this Court did not materialize. The intervenors likewise assert that the defendants would cease negotiating settlements when an order was issued. The settlement postures of each defendant have not been hampered by this Court and are controlled by the defendants.

It is finally argued by intervenors that plaintiff Stover, knowing that she might be selected as a class representative, could pressure the defendants into a lucrative settlement. This argument presumes that the able defense counsel of this community are susceptible to such pressure and that they would want to "buy-off" a potential class representative. While intervenors are to be commended for asserting the interests of those defendants presently engaged in the settlement process, they have not shown that Stover received more for her claim than her claim was worth. In fact, her case was not settled. As the discussion of the allegations suggests, the intervenors, in an attempt to avoid a potentially adverse decision, have fashioned these supposed disadvantages out of the winds of speculation.

The Court is alert to the possibility that those who challenge its impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of an adverse decision. Though the Court was never sure of what ruling it would make until this order was drafted and entered, the Court did intimate at the December 10, 1981 certification hearing that it was impressed by the availability of the class action device in

the skywalk suits. The intervenors, in the representation of their clients' interests, have been the most vocal opponents of class certification. While the Court applauds their zealous representation, it cannot ignore the fact that intervenors truly want to avoid the consequences of an adverse decision and would welcome the opportunity to relitigate the certification issue before another judge. The Court is also cognizant that no active judge in residence of the Western District can accept responsibility for presiding over this case by reason of their previous disqualification due to conflicts of interest.

Even if every allegation made by the intervenors was founded on the truth, this Court concludes that a reasonable person, after considering all of the circumstances, would not question the impartiality of this Court. Thus, the intervenors' motion to disqualify this Court from the continued conduct of this litigation is denied.

V. *Conclusion*

In order to expeditiously adjudicate the issues raised by this skywalk litigation with a minimum of repetition, expense and delay, the Court firmly believes that the creation of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability for compensatory and punitive damages, and a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages best serves the diverse interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Legitimate claimants may negotiate and execute settlement agreements with those defendants who have vociferously urged this Court to allow the settlement process to continue. Those claimants who want to exact payment for allegedly punishable acts must forego the settlement process and await the trial of the punitive damage issues.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion to disqualify is denied. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff Riley's motion to certify a class action is denied. It is further

ORDERED that a class action is certified and that plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey shall serve as the representatives of the class. It is further

ORDERED that counsel for plaintiff Riley shall serve as lead counsel and that counsel for plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathey shall assist lead counsel. It is further

ORDERED that other interested attorneys who would like to be considered as counsel for the class and who have not previously informed this Court of their position have until seven (7) days after the date of this order to submit their names for service as class counsel. It is further

ORDERED that the intervenors' motion for interlocutory appeal is denied. It is further

ORDERED that the intervenors' motion for abstention is denied. It is further

ORDERED that discovery be completed by July 1, 1982, and that the trial of this action be commenced on August 15, 1982.

/s/ Scott O. Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT
United States District Judge

Kansas City, Mo.

January 25, 1982.

APPENDIX E

Rule 23. Class Actions

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class,

shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.

(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.)